#SpaceWatchGL Op’ed: India’s strategy in space is changing. Here’s why

As a part of the partnership between SpaceWatch.World and Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, we now have been granted permission to publish chosen articles and texts. That is “India’s technique in house is altering. Right here’s why”, initially printed 14 August 2019

After a niche of greater than a 12 months, I wrote a brief essay for The World Economic Forum. On this essay, I targeted on India’s geopolitical technique in house.  Half a century after people first walked on the Moon, house remains to be as a lot about scientific discovery as it’s about strategic competitors.

As was the case in the course of the Chilly Conflict, outer house is an area of terrestrial geopolitics. We will see this within the elevated impetus for competitors in numerous achievements in outer house, comparable to Moon landings, Mars exploration and, extra immediately, within the creation of house forces in numerous international locations – France being the most recent to announce it intends to determine an area command to enhance defence capabilities.

But, regardless of outer house being as soon as once more a discipline of energy competitors, there are additionally some variations from the Chilly Conflict years. First, and most importantly, there are lots of extra international locations and actors concerned: in Asia itself, China, Japan and India are main spacefaring nations, and smaller gamers comparable to South Korea, Australia and Singapore are growing their very own house programmes.

A aggressive chain response that (generally) reaches house

What happens in house could be the results of a geopolitical chain response. As an example, take into account the US-China-India relationship: China typically takes motion due to its strategic competitors with the US.
This has an impression on India, forcing India to reply. However India’s response to China has an impact on Pakistan, which then responds to India. This cascade could be seen on land, and at instances, in house. For instance, China’s first profitable anti-satellite (ASAT) check in January 2007 was to show a catch-up effort with the US. However as soon as China examined its ASAT in 2007, India had little selection however to develop its personal ASAT due to the necessity of deterrence.
However within the house area, the aggressive cascade doesn’t journey all the best way to Pakistan as a result of Pakistan’s house programme is underdeveloped. Whereas Pakistan has expended appreciable nationwide wealth in holding tempo with India in its nuclear and missile capabilities, it has not accomplished so with regard to outer house.

Then again, there could be a safety incentive for Pakistan to show that it additionally has an ASAT functionality.
Pakistan may additionally develop different counterspace capabilities, together with cyber and digital means to focus on India’s house belongings. Whereas this stays speculative to this point, the historical past of India-Pakistan competitors means that this stays a risk.

Evolution of technique

India had lengthy maintained a moderately doctrinaire strategy towards house safety, emphasising the peaceable makes use of of outer house and opposing the weaponization and militarization of house. Thus, India had opposed the US Strategic Protection Initiative programme and different efforts to construct ballistic missile defences, not to mention deploying ASAT techniques. The explanations for such an strategy was pretty clear: India didn’t home these capabilities.
However by the early 2000s, India’s place had begun to vary as Pakistan started buying long-range missiles. India felt the necessity to construct ballistic missile defences, main New Delhi to take a sympathetic view of the George W. Bush administration’s choice to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in late 2001. By the tip of the last decade, as India’s personal capabilities elevated, it was clear that India was changing into extra discriminating in its angle in the direction of house safety.
China’s ASAT check in 2007 helped advance India’s means of revaluating its house technique. India realised that its rising investments in outer house – till then largely civilian in nature – have been now below menace from China’s new safety capabilities. India additionally began pondering extra about how one can handle outer house for safety functions. Because of this, India established an area cell below its Built-in Defence Headquarters shortly after China’s ASAT check.
In April 2019, India established the Defence Area Company (DSA) as an interim measure to command the navy’s house capabilities. All of this meant that India needed to have a way more nuanced place than a blanket strategy that opposed any militarization or weaponization of outer house.

Nonetheless, the implications of unbridled militarization and the weaponization of outer house has detrimental implications for India. Subsequently, whereas India is pursuing a technique that satisfies its personal safety pursuits, it nonetheless desires some worldwide management on the militarization and weaponization of outer house.

The unique could be discover right here – https://securitystrategyrajagopalan.blogspot.com/2019/08/indias-strategy-in-space-is-changing.html. Rights reserved – this publication is reproduced with permission from Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan.

Bio: Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is presently a Distinguished Fellow and I head the Nuclear & Area Coverage Initiative on the Observer Analysis Basis, New Delhi. She can be the Technical Advisor to a brand new UN Group of Governmental Consultants (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Area (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). Because the senior Asia defence author for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic points. She joined ORF after a five-year stint on the Nationwide Safety Council Secretariat (2003-2007), the place she was an Assistant Director. Previous to becoming a member of the NSCS, she was Analysis Officer on the Institute of Defence Research and Analyses, New Delhi. She was additionally a Visiting Professor on the Graduate Institute of Worldwide Politics, Nationwide Chung Hsing College, Taiwan in 2012.